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1. Introducing the Challenge and Our Motivation 
 
The present paper examines Jan Koster’s “skeptical view on Biolinguistics and 
linguistic internalism” (Koster 2009: 61),1 and concludes on a far more positive 
note than he does regarding the prospect of this emerging field. Examining Kos-
ter’s challenge also gives us the opportunity to point that while it is important to 
remember, as Jackendoff (2010) stresses, that thinking about the biology of lang-
uage (e.g., its evolution) ‘depends on one’s view of language’, it is equally impor-
tant to bear in mind that thinking about the biology of language also depends on 
one’s view of biology. We think that this point is worth emphasizing at a time 
when both modern linguistics and biology are re-examining their foundations. 
 Let us begin by stating Koster’s argument in a nutshell. In order for 
languages to be acquired and used, Koster (hereafter, K) agrees, certain uniquely 
human biological requirements are required. However, so K’s argument goes, in 
as much as human biology is not ‘transparent’ with respect to its role in 
language, the idea of translating these biological underpinnings into a distinctive 
mental faculty (often called ‘the faculty of language’, FL, or ‘the language organ’) 
makes no more sense than positing distinctive faculties for human activities such 
as trumpet playing or bicycle riding, or (to invoke distinctively human anatomi-
cal sites) hat-wearing or glasses-supporting systems. It is K’s contention that this 
‘Panglossian’ drift of modern linguistics (we have a language faculty in order to 
support languages, much like we have a nose to support glasses) is the historical 
consequence of generative grammarians having uncritically adopted a series of 
conceptually problematic and empirically unwarranted compromises since 
Chomsky (1957), the latest outcome of which is the chimerical discipline now 
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known as Biolinguistics, devoted to uncovering the biological foundations of said 
language faculty.  
 We, as advocates of Biolinguistics, think that is important to meet K’s 
challenge. After all, K has had a distinguished career as a theoretical linguist, and 
is deeply familiar with the issues and practice of theoretical, ‘Chomskyan’ 
linguistics. In addition, K’s is a sophisticated argument constructed upon several 
interesting premises that are worth thinking about, and to which we now turn.  
 
2. Language is Words, Words, and Words 
 
K’s first premise is that language is not within our brains, but within our words. 
This is not an in itself invalidating argument against Biolinguistics, as words 
could still happen to be natural, biological objects (within our brains), but it 
nevertheless is, according to K, a first necessary step in order to dismantle the 
whole biolinguistic project. Let’s see why. 
 K argues that Biolinguistics is constructed upon the belief that the human 
brain contains a system specifically devoted to computing linguistic expressions, 
which can be abstracted away from other peripheral components of FL and 
which is furthermore considered the site of one of the most distinguishing 
features of language: namely, ‘recursion’ (unbounded nested-embedding) — i.e. 
as in Hauser et al. (2002). But such a belief is, according to K, nothing more than a 
historical residue of Chomsky’s (1957) thesis on the ‘autonomy of syntax’, an idea 
that K takes to have been de facto rejected in Chomsky’s subsequent works with 
the adoption of the ‘lexicalist hypothesis’ (Chomsky 1970), and to which we will 
come back.  
 K’s own contention regarding this issue reads as follows: Linguistic recur-
sion is not a property of an autonomous system of computation, but a property of 
words, because, according to the lexicalist position that K endorses, it is in the 
words’ content that instructions are encoded as to how they are to be combined 
— for example, by means of a structure headed by a word of the same type.  
 It is obvious that in order for the resulting structures to be full-fledged, a 
rather powerful computational space is required. However, according to K, such 
a space is just a biological substrate that ‘facilitates’ the completion of the 
properties of words (such as linguistic recursion). Moreover, K takes such a space 
not be ‘transparent’ with respect to these properties, meaning that the biological 
substrate would remain ‘ignorant’ of the facilitated properties were it not for the 
fact that humans have historically given it such a linguistic functionality. So K’s 
conclusion is that the human brain does not incorporate a system in charge of 
computing linguistic expressions, but a general-purpose computational space, on 
which linguistic functionality simply rides, thanks to words. Because K views 
words themselves as inherently cultural symbols, as opposed to natural, 
biological units, there cannot be any proper field of study devoted to the biology 
of language.  
 
3. Decomposing and Deconstructing K’s Arguments 
 
Let us note that K’s view is an updated version of an idea with a long-standing 
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pedigree that K traces back to Sapir (1921), but as a matter of fact it is explicitly 
articulated as well in Whitney (1875), where the contention is already made that 
language is just a matter of having (culturally) discovered how to put into a 
derived or secondary use natural resources inherently unrelated to it. It also was 
Saussure’s (1916) idea, who expressed in very similar terms the relation of 
language to Broca’s region, as well as the official position of European 
functionalism — as witnessed, for example, in Martinet (1960). For K, departing 
from this venerable tradition would require more compelling arguments than 
those so far adduced by biologically oriented linguists. 
 Historical and traditional considerations aside, the substantive part of K’s 
argument actually splits into two different theses, the first one having to do with 
the centrality of words, and the second one with the non-specificity of the system 
subserving the computation of linguistic expressions. We will now try to show 
that none of these arguments is compelling enough as to support K’s anti-
naturalist stance on language.  
 
3.1. Lexicalism vs. Lexicocentrism 
 
For purposes of K’s argument, we can define lexicalism as the position according 
to which grammars to a great extent have the forms that they do thanks to the 
instructions encoded in words, contained in their lexicons. As we already stated 
above, the reason why K believes that lexicalism is such a problematic, indeed 
lethal aspect for any biolinguistic project is that words are inherently cultural, not 
natural/biological entities: Words are “man-made, public cultural objects” 
(Koster 2009: 66). Accordingly, if lexicalism is assumed and the combinatorial 
properties of language are taken to depend on properties of words, such combi-
natorial properties will have to be traced back to cultural, not natural/biological 
attributes.  
 But how true is lexicalism? And how essential are words?  
 For K, as we saw, they are pretty much everything. As he writes on his 
website (see fn. 1), where he summarizes his view: “Invented words rather than 
syntax are at the essence of language in this view, while recursive syntax is seen 
as a successful extension of the properties of the cultural objects in question 
(‘words’)”. In other words, for K, “[s]yntactic structures are not generated by 
lexicon-independent rules (like phrase structure rules or Merge) but as the 
spelling out of the contextual properties of lexical items (‘valency’)”.  
 Other linguists, too, ascribe an essential role to words (though they do not 
conclude from this that Biolinguistics is a doomed enterprise). Here is a repre-
sentative quote from Pinker and Jackendoff (2005):   
We now come to an aspect of language that is utterly essential to it: the 
word. In the minimal case, a word is an arbitrary association of a chunk of 
phonology and a chunk of conceptual structure, stored in speakers’ long-
term memory (the lexicon) […]. [W]ords have several properties that appear 
to be uniquely human […]. Our assessment of the situation is that words, as 
shared, organized linkages of phonological, conceptual, and grammatical 
structures, are a distinctive language-specific part of human knowledge […]. 
[A] good portion of people’s knowledge of words (especially verbs and 
functional morphemes) consists of exactly the kind of information that is 
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manipulated by recursive syntax, the component held to make up the 
narrow language faculty.        (Pinker & Jackendoff 2005: 213–215)  
But a growing number of linguists are coming to the conclusion that words2 are 
not distinguished building blocks in syntax or morphology or semantics, and that 
lexicalism, or as one of us has come to call it, ‘lexicocentrism’ is not the right 
model for FL. Here are a few representative quotes:3   
In this work I have claimed that a word is a morpheme sequence that shows 
internal cohesion and has independent contribution relative to other 
morphemes. I have argued that these properties stem from the syntax: 
although each morpheme is inserted separately into syntactic structure, 
syntax may cause some groups of morphemes to show the behavior 
characteristic of words […]. If two morphemes form a distributional unit of 
this kind [one that cannot be interrupted — SB, CB & GL] every time they 
appear together, the two morphemes in question will be perceived as one 
word. This means that ‘word’ in the non-phonological sense is a 
distributional concept […]. Crucially, there is not one single syntactic 
configuration that underlies all complex words […]. On this approach, 
words are not necessarily syntactic constituents […]. The consequence of 
these claims is that words do not really have a place in grammar at all. From 
the point of view of grammar, ‘word’ is an epiphenomenon, and not a basic 
concept.               (Julien 2002: 321–322)  
A Word, as conventionally conceived, is a syntactic constituent which 
(happens) to correspond to a phonological unit of a given size (e.g., for the 
assignment of primary stress). While it is likely that there are some universal 
constraints on what syntactic constituents can correspond to such 
phonological units, beyond that, the mapping is language specific, and 
syntactic constituents of equal complexity may or may not be phonological-
stress units. Crucially, then, Words are not syntactic primitives or atomic in 
any meaningful sense.                (Borer 2005: 1)  
Marantz (2000) adds the following relevant observation:   
It’s somehow intuitive to think that knowing a language involves knowing 
the words of the language. Linguists that start with this notion quickly get 
into trouble by not being clear about what a ‘word’ is such that a speaker 
might know it or what ‘know’ is such that a speaker might ‘know’ a word. 
Jackendoff (1997) argues that the ‘lexicon’ should be extended to include 
units larger than phrases. But doesn’t the Wheel of Fortune corpus rather 
argue against the correlation between ‘memorized’ and ‘special linguistic 
properties’? We know we’ve encountered [Any friend of yours is a friend of 
mine] just as we know we’ve encountered ‘nationalization’ (with a certain 
measurable degree of certainty). That means, in some sense, we’ve stored 
these items — in some way or other. But does ‘storage’ necessarily imply 
‘storage in a special linguistic Lexicon’? Jackendoff’s observations call into 
question the notion that we don’t store information about structures unless 
the structures have special linguistic properties. None of the examples [he 
provides] have special structure — none involve special connections 
between sound and meaning. Rather than arguing for an extended lexicon, 
Jackendoff is actually arguing that we should abandon the notion of a 
                                                   
    2 Or even morphemes; see Starke (2010), Boeckx (2010a). 
    3 We quote the relevant passages in full, as we don’t want to give the impression of 
constructing a strawman. 
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‘lexicon’ (of items with internal structure) entirely.  
 Jackendoff pulls a fast one on us. He suggests that anyone trying to 
keep ‘fixed expressions’ out of the lexicon is trying to keep them out of the 
language. But, since fixed expressions are made of words (phrases, 
phonology, etc.), they are clearly part of language. What he fails to argue 
successfully is that fixed expressions have the sorts of meanings that need to 
be negotiated by the linguistic system. Knowledge about ‘any friend of 
yours is a friend of mine’ is clearly knowledge about a linguistic object — 
but that linguistic object is constructed via the generative system of the 
language.                  (Marantz 2000: 1–2)  
True, as Marantz (1997: 201) points out, most contemporary theories of grammar 
assume a general organization in which elementary constituents are drawn from 
a place called the ‘Lexicon’ for composition in the syntax. But when linguistic 
practice is scrutinized, as Boeckx (2010a) has done, far less than the full array of 
properties traditionally ascribed to words turns out to be needed. In fact, Boeckx 
goes so far as to argue that no notion more than the ‘edge feature’, as defined by 
Chomsky in the following quote, is needed to reconstruct the essential properties 
ascribed to the faculty of language in the narrow sense:   
For a L[exical] I[tem] to be able to enter into a computation, merging with 
some [syntactic object], it must have some property permitting this 
operation. A property of an LI is called a feature, so an LI has a feature that 
permits it to be merged. Call this the edge-feature (EF) of the LI.  
(Chomsky 2008: 139)  
If it is indeed true that the edge property is the only lexical property needed to 
jump start (Narrow) Syntax, words lose the centrality they have in K’s argument.  
 What we have pointed out just now is in fact an old observation, already 
made by Otero (1976). Consider the following quotes:4  
Given the theoretical framework Chomsky had developed in [Chomsky 
(1965)], it is somewhat surprising that he did not go on to draw what, from a 
generative perspective, appears to be a very natural, if not inescapable, 
conclusion, namely that morphemic representations play no role in the 
(syntagmatic) derivation of a sentence.   
 Otero goes on to formulate the ‘Dual Hypothesis’, according to which “a 
grammatical system consists of two major modules: (i) a syntagmatic grammar; 
(ii) a paradigmatic grammar”. Otero notes that this “yields a much improved 
theory of generative grammar” — “a form of grammar that is conceptually 
simpler”:  
[O]ne with fully differentiated but internally homogeneous components. 
The syntagmatic subsystem consists of a central component (the syntax) and 
two interpretive components (the phonetics and the semantics). The 
syntactic component consists of a recursive set of context-free phrase-
structure rules and a transformational subcomponent with root transform-
ations, one nonlocal transformation (‘move C’) and a set of local trans-
formations in the sense of Emonds (to a great extent language particular), 
which together generate what might be called ‘construction forms’ (cf. LSLT 
                                                   
    4 Otero’s important study remains unpublished, and the transcript of the talk hard to gain 
access to. For this reason, we reproduce significant portion of his argument here. 
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[Chomsky 1975 — SB, CB & GL], §33.1), that is, abstract phrase markers 
including only syntactic category and subcategory feature specifications […] 
The ‘construction forms’ will presumably be enough to derive a ‘logical 
form’ […]; a full interpretation can only be derived after the insertion of 
phonological matrices of words (in the extended sense) from the 
paradigmatic subsystem. 
 
Otero further notes that:  
A syntagmatic grammar is essentially universal (biologically given in 
essence), while a paradigmatic grammar is, to a considerable extent, a 
historically evolving subsystem, burdened with the weight of the past, like 
other cultural systems. Only a paradigmatic grammar can be fossiliferous. 
This brings to mind the distinction between ‘core grammar’ and a 
‘periphery’ of ‘borrowings, historical residues, inventions, and so on’, which 
we can hardly expect to — and indeed would not want to — incorporate 
within a principled theory of UG. 
 Every paradigmatic grammar is, to a considerable extent, language 
particular, and to some extent fossilized, while the syntagmatic grammar 
can be assumed to be a fairly direct reflection of the language faculty of the 
mind/brain […]. No student of human language ever dreamed of a 
universal dictionary. 
 
 Otero concludes that at the syntagmatic level “there is only one language, 
as the evolutionary biologist would expect”. 
 This, we submit, is what makes Biolinguistics possible, a point to which we 
will return presently when we deal with the issue of transparency. But let us first 
expand a bit more on the question of lexicalism with an additional observation 
we believe it may be relevant to complement the ones put forth so far.  
 To be sure, K could argue that what we have just shown is that lexicalism is 
a debated issue — something that linguists have been unable to agree upon — 
and that this doesn’t necessarily invalidate the contention that if lexicalism is 
true, then Biolinguistics is impossible. To which we could retort that K’s faith in 
lexicalism doesn’t make it true either and that a closer look at the fate of what we 
could call ‘radical lexicalist frameworks’ casts serious doubts, if not over the 
‘truth’ of the lexicalist hypothesis (‘truth’ being a rather strong word), perhaps 
over the general viability of the whole program, at least in the form K appears to 
interpret it.  
 It is important to note from the outset that K’s main reference for lexicalism 
is the Government & Binding (GB) framework of Chomsky (1981) and subse-
quent work, a grammatical theory that always kept a substantial bulk of its 
grammatical principles away from the lexicon and that was often seen from other 
quarters (most of them based in California) as relying too much on configu-
rational notions to account for certain grammatical phenomena. A case in point 
is, for example, Binding Theory (by the way, one of K’s favorites; see, for 
example, Koster 1987: Chaps. 3 and 6), which was mostly based on the notion of 
c-command, a structural relation between nodes in a tree which need not both be 
within the domain of a head word and its dependants, and which was 
‘lexicalized’ by, for example, Pollard & Sag (1992, 1994) in an illustrative attempt 
to remove such principles from the syntax and place them directly in the lexicon, 
in the internal structure of words.  
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 Our reference to HPSG is not casual, as it is perhaps the grammatical 
framework that most clearly illustrates the point we want to make here, although 
similar points could be made with respect to LFG or the various versions of 
Categorial Grammar (CG). The point is that LFG, HPSG, CG never, ever, 
assumed that phrase structure could or had to be lexicalized in some way or 
another — witness LFG’s c-structures, HPSG’s ID rules (or its two types of signs: 
words and phrases) and CG operations of functional application and functional 
composition (plus type raising, which is ‘syntactic’ not lexical). Now, from the 
fact that all these frameworks have always needed something more than just 
words to account for the context-free backbone is, in our opinion, the 
demonstration that it is not enough with the combinatorial properties of words to 
get some structure. Structure doesn’t come for free and, in fact, assuming this 
strikes us as a fallacy equivalent to that of claiming that genes are ‘replicators’, 
which they aren’t, since no replication is possible without all the cellular 
machinery in charge of actually doing that; in a similar vein, words are not 
‘combinators’, but combinable building blocks in (desperate) need of a 
combinatorial operation. It is perhaps impossible to lexicalize structure and this 
perhaps explains, for example, HPSG’s steady development in the direction of 
becoming a version of construction grammar (Ginzburg & Sag 2000, Sag, in 
press), where the traditional distinction between lexicon and grammar is blurred 
into a continuum consisting of pure lexical constructions at one extreme of the 
spectrum and multiword (or ‘combinatorial’, to use Sag’s, in press, terminology) 
constructions at the other end.5 
 Summarizing, then, perhaps words and groupings of words are some kind 
of cultural objects, but as such they are transparent with respect to their underlying 
biological structures (call them Unification, Merge, Phrase Structure Rules or 
whatever operation is responsible of building the structures). This takes us to the 
issue of transparency and domain-specificity. 
 
3.2. Transparency and Domain-Specificity 
 
As for the second part of K’s argument, it reduces to the idea that the system that 
computes linguistic expressions is not transparent with respect to the properties 
of words because it is a system with no inherent specialization, subserving and 
facilitating the tasks of a wide array of domains — language among them. In K’s 
own words: “My argument is not against innateness but against the idea that 
biological structures are transparent with respect to their cultural functions, 
including their role in language” (Koster 2009: 66).  
 K’s argument is subtle and deserves careful examination. Its initial premise 
is that biological structures are not transparent with respect to their functions, 
indeed that biological structures are all functionally unspecific. Thus, the 
                                                   
    5 This is not to be taken as a criticism of construction grammar, as, for the purposes of this 
paper, we would like to remain agnostic as to what is the best approach to grammatical 
description. We just find it symptomatic that linguists with a historical strong commitment 
with lexicalism are abandoning it in favor of other clearly non-lexicalist models. Thus, in 
addition to HPSG, we could cite the case of Ray Jackendoff, also coming closer to 
construction grammar (e.g., Goldberg & Jackendoff 2004) or Joan Bresnan, now favoring 
probabilistic approaches to grammar (e.g., Bresnan 2007). 
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computational system underlying language, being biological, did no evolve ‘for 
language’ (remember, words) but only acquired its linguistic functionality once 
language (i.e. words) was invented; from this we can only conclude that there 
isn’t anything internal specific to language (which is external), since its current 
functionality was imposed from the outside, and, thus, Biolinguistics, being 
concerned with the internal biological structures underlying language, is 
impossible. 
 The problem here is that Koster has it backwards. It is certainly true that 
biological structures are never transparent with respect to their functions 
(cultural or otherwise), expecting the contrary would constitute a natural 
theological assumption that was untenable for most biologists even before 
Darwin (e.g., Owen 1849). Indeed, the process of acquiring one (or more) 
functions is a historical one, a dialectic between the formal properties of the 
biological structure and several environmental factors. From this, however, it 
doesn’t follow that form and function are entirely decoupled, as K seems to 
suggest, but rather that functions, behaviors, etc., are transparent with respect to the 
biological structures underlying them, and that from the analysis of behaviors, 
cultural objects, etc., independently of their function, one can infer important 
properties of the said biological structures. In other words, we contend that from 
the lack of specificity and the lack of functional transparency of structure — from 
which K derives the thesis that the system that computes words in combinations 
is inherently unfamiliar to language — nothing of interest can be said, since 
transparency works in the other direction, from function to structure. For us then, 
a system of computation can be unspecific and, an the same time, an inherent 
component of FL — as well as the other faculties that it subserves, as actually 
witnessed by the fact that it is transparent to the properties manifested by words 
— or other symbols in different domains (say, music or arithmetic). This position, 
we think, deserves to be carefully explained and contrasted with K’s opposing 
views.  
 K’s position is that there does not exist such a thing as a language-specific 
system of computation, and that in the absence of such a system it makes no 
sense to postulate the existence of FL — i.e. a naturally evolved cognitive system 
in charge of linguistic tasks. The rationale underlying K’s contention is that 
organic systems acquire their functional specializations by two different means: 
a) as a result of ‘natural selection’, in which case they can be properly deemed 
‘adaptations for doing X’ — as in the case of the lungs and breathing; or b) as a 
consequence of ‘intentional decision’, in which case they become ‘instruments for 
doing X’ — as in the case of the lungs and playing the trumpet. According to K, 
language belongs to the second category, as it is the cumulative outcome of 
particular intentional agents having historically decided to give a secondary use 
to systems — including a computational system—naturally evolved for other 
purposes. So K’s idea is that in as much as it makes sense to speak of a language-
dedicated computational system, it is just as an instrumentally adapted 
apparatus to a non-natural function. As a consequence, no natural language-
dedicated computational system can be said to exist — and, concomitantly, no 
such a thing as FL actually exists.  
 It is our impression, however, that there is a flaw in K’s rationale that 
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compromises this chain of deductions. In a few words: the idea that every single 
organic system has a ‘proper function’ corresponds to a narrow-minded, old-
fashioned, and probably wrong biology of sorts. Let’s explain why.  
 Contrary to common wisdom, organic systems are not inherently adapted 
to fulfill particular functions. They naturally evolve certain structural properties 
that endow them with the capacity of performing some activities, while others 
fall completely outside of their dynamic potential. So the activity that a given 
structure normally or most prominently runs — the one that we are tempted to 
attribute it as its ‘proper function’ — is better to be understood as a contingent 
effect of that structure’s connections to other organic systems and to a particular 
environment. What it is truly inherent to natural systems is their potential to 
perform a more or less open array of activities, were their organic or 
environmental context to change — in Reid’s (2007) terminology, their 
‘adaptability’; see also Balari & Lorenzo (2010a, 2010b).6 Based on this, our claim 
is that it makes perfect sense to speak of an organic system as inherently devoid 
of a specific function, while acquiring different specializations as it naturally 
evolves certain connections to other systems and starts to be sensitive to certain 
environmental inputs. For us, this is a very suitable description for the system of 
computation underlying linguistic brain activity, and one capable of legitimately 
inspiring the biological study of FL.  
 Curiously enough, K’s reasoning is to a certain extent parallel to our own 
and he even makes use of a notion of ‘recycling’ — adopted from Dehaene (2009) 
— that can be seen as the cultural counterpart of the idea of ‘adaptability’ 
referred to above. K is in apparent agreement with us when he contends that 
“there is no such a thing as an intrinsic function of a physical structure” (Koster 
2009: 69). However, while we defend that this is the case even when a structure 
seems to fix some practical specialization within a certain context — internal, 
external, or both, for K this is a state of affairs that applies only up to the point at 
which either natural selection ‘adapts’ (or ‘exapts’) it for a natural function — as 
in the case of breathing — or human invention ‘recycles’ it for non-natural tasks 
— as in the case of language.  
 Before closing the topic of the domain-unspecific character of the cognitive 
resources dedicated to language, let’s observe that K’s argument against 
Biolinguistics contrasts with another current of opinion according to which for 
linguistics to fulfill the project of becoming a branch of the natural sciences, a 
relaxation of the degree of specificity of the said resources is a crucial requisite. 
Otherwise, no true convergence with standard biological disciplines as 
neuroscience or genetics can reasonably be expected (Boeckx 2010b, Hornstein 
2009). The logic underlying the idea is clear: the more specific the mechanisms 
put into use in a certain domain — as it is routinely assumed by most descriptive 
approaches in the case of language, the more difficult it becomes to connect them 
with their putative variants in other organisms — and, consequently, the less 
plausible any evolutionary explanation for their emergence. Thus, far from 
                                                   
    6 An evolutionary corollary of this idea is that highly specialized structures — ‘adaptations’ 
— are more a risk than an advantage in the long run, given both the plasticity of organisms 
and the instability of environments. This kind of considerations is not, however, our main 
focus of interest here. 
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putting at risk the biolinguistic enterprise, the task of decomposing previously 
thought language-specific mechanisms into domain-general ones is for some, 
including ourselves, an urgent necessity in order to frame linguistic explanations 
within normal biological practice.  
 In other words, what K takes to be a lethal path for Biolinguistics — the 
path that Chomsky (2007) has called “approaching Universal Grammar from 
below”, we take to be a desideratum for a rapprochement between linguistics and 
biology. What makes these two opposite interpretations possible is the fact that 
what counts as biology is not fixed once and for all. Jackendoff (2010) was 
certainly right when he said (adapting his statement slightly) that one’s view of 
the biology of language depends on one’s view of language, but we wish to stress 
that it also depends on one’s view of biology.7 It is indeed important to bear in 
mind that biology is far from a simple field. Many are the biologists who have 
argued for a pluralist conception of the life sciences (note the plural!) (see, e.g., 
Gould 2002, Pigliucci & Mueller 2010), and even strong advocates of narrow, 
pan-adaptationist conceptions of biology such as the late Ernst Mayr (“the 
Darwin of the 20th century”) recognized the need to distinguish between two 
kinds of science, cutting across traditional disciplines like biology, for instance. 
Mayr (2004: 13, 24) leans toward attaching what he calls functional/‘mechanistic’ 
biology (i.e. molecular biology) to the natural sciences, and what he calls evolu-
tionary biology to the historical sciences, and notes that each science has its own 
methodology and principles.  
 The same distinction may be necessary in the context of the language 
sciences, with one part of the field devoted to more cultural aspects of language, 
the languages — call this part (theoretical) philology —, and another devoted to 
the more natural aspects of language — call this Biolinguistics.  
 Ironically, K himself once pointed out (Koster 2003) that Chomskyan 
linguistics pursued along minimalist lines was “not philology by other means” 
(p. 171). We think this is exactly right, and moreover we think that this vindicates 
Biolinguistics. What is true of largely cultural entities like languages need not be 
true of the language faculty: whereas few would deny that the morphosyntax or 
grammar of particular languages is largely determined by their lexicons, we 
                                                   
    7 Ironically enough, a conception of words almost identical to that of K is not seen as an 
obstacle, according to some authors, in order to approaching language with biologically 
informed lenses. It is the case, for example, of Millikan’s (2005) self-styled ‘biological model’ 
on linguistic conventions, according to which words are individually created items that 
replicate, proliferate and eventually become fixed for their coordinative benefits — 
relatively to similar units — within a community of users. Thus lexical inventories — with 
their grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic associated rules — are historical outcomes of 
ordinary Darwinian processes of differential reproduction and survival of the fittest. 
     Despite appearances, Millikan’s and K’s are not incongruous models. On the contrary, K’s 
anti-biologicist stance on words is fully compatible with Millikan’s biological model, as 
Millikan’s is just a variant of Universal Darwinism, which means that the ‘model’ put 
forward in order to explain linguistic units is biological, but not the ‘object’ to which the 
model applies. Besides, Millikan is explicit in declaring that the objects to which her model 
applies have nothing to do with individual psychology and, therefore, with Biolinguistics as 
properly understood. So Millikan belongs to the same anti-biological quarters as K, even if 
contending that some laws exist that universally hold in both the biological and the cultural 
realms. So the question remains whether words are inherently foreign to individual psycho-
logy — and whether they justify a biological approach to language. 
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submit that the syntactic principles of Universal Grammar are completely 
independent of the cultural constructs we call words (or morphemes). Such 
principles continue to depend on atomic units, but these units only consist of 
natural instructions.  
 
4. A Note on the Proposition that Words Are Tools and Language Is the 
Technology Embodied by Them 
 
In this section we would like to briefly examine the contrast K introduces 
between the conception of ‘language-as-an-organ’ (FL) and his conception of 
‘language-as-a-technology’ (TL).  
 The latter conception is not completely new, as it is vaguely suggested in 
McLuham (1964) and developed in Logan (2007), where the contention is 
explicitly made that language belongs to a series of human inventions 
comprising spoken language, writing, mathematics, science, computing, and the 
Internet. Logan’s thesis is that all these practices are technical improvements 
connected to the human necessity of representing and transmitting knowledge, 
each one historically emerging at points of informational overload that made 
insufficient the pre-existing technologies. A shortcoming of the idea — and one 
of which Logan is not unaware — is that improving an existing technique is a 
thing very different from creating it from scratch, so the question remains of how 
something like a TL could be created. This is by the way a question that, in 
slightly different contexts, also worried Humboldt (1836) and Rousseau (1781), 
and to which both responded by appealing to an instinctual basis for language.  
 K’s ingenious alternative is a different one — and one that deserves to be 
carefully scrutinized: language (TL) is a human creation resulting from the prior 
invention of words. In other terms, TL results from the impact of words on the 
human brain — a source of extremely powerful cognitive resources, but 
otherwise a linguistic blank slate. Towards the end of this section we’ll return to 
the issue of transparency in order to argue, among other things, that it is not an 
easy task — if a feasible one at all — to explain how properties such as 
compositionality and productivity could be added to the pack of inventions 
associated to words. But problems with K’s conjecture are more serious than that. 
It is K’s opinion that his view can comfortably be framed within the ‘extended 
mind’ paradigm (Clark 1997, Clark & Chalmers 1998), as it purports that 
language-associated mental activity results from the recruitment of external 
inputs (words) by general purpose and linguistically opaque cognitive systems. It 
is not clear, however, that such an assumption is so congenial with the extended 
mind framework as normally envisioned by its advocates. Let’s see why.  
 Proponents of the extended mind model are not committed to any 
particular cognitive architecture — and this obviously includes the idea of mind 
as a blank slate of sorts prior to its embedding in the world. They just defend that 
(some) cognitive systems incorporate elements of the environment, so they 
comprise both internal and external components, the role of which in the normal 
execution of the system’s activities is seen as functionally equivalent. The 
question is however orthogonal to that concerning the specificity — or lack 
thereof — of the relevant systems. So, in principle, the ‘extended’ thesis is 
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compatible with cognitive architectures of any degree of modularity. However, 
there exist strong arguments — put forward in Rupert (2009) with great detail — 
suggesting that ‘extended’ systems are only operative if their internal 
components are highly articulated and robustly constructed modules, in the 
absence of which it is not to be expected any particularly useful sensitivity to 
external inputs. As a matter of fact, Rupert’s (2009) conclusion is that the 
extended mind rhetoric can be dispensed with entirely without great harm to our 
understanding of cognition, saying instead that minds comprise an integrated set 
of mechanisms and capacities in the functioning of which certain environmental 
inputs may exert an important causal impact.  
 It is not particularly important for our argument whether the question is 
settled in favor o against preserving the ‘extended’ idea and its vocabulary. The 
substantive part of the question is that words — understood as ‘man-made, 
public cultural objects’ — seem to be of little help to cognition in the absence of 
an associated set of internal mechanisms and capacities that, as we have argued 
at length, happens to be ‘transparent’ with respect to the properties of these 
external objects — and thus deserve the name of FL.  
 At this point, we would like to stress what we take to be another important 
aspect of words, in the context of K’s challenge. A particular lexical inventory is 
obviously a cultural phenomenon — there is no point in discussing this. 
However, it is far more contentious whether the units composing them belong to 
a same category with the symbols of other non-linguistic cultural inventories (for 
the ease of discussion, we will refer to the former as ‘words’ and to the latter as 
‘symbols’). In our opinion, there exist good reasons to believe that they do not 
(Balari et al. 2011, for a detailed argument). The crucial point is that the 
information encoded in symbols is ‘opaque’ in a sense in which the information 
encoded in words is not, in that in order to be a competent user of symbols one 
needs to be familiar with the contexts in which they show up and how they relate 
with each other in each particular context of use (Eco 1975). This kind of 
acquaintance is not however a requisite in order to be fully competent as a word-
system user, as once one knows the information encoded in given words, she 
gains access to the information encoded in combinations thereof, even without 
previous familiarity with the contexts in which these words’ use is appropriate 
and even if no such contexts happen to exist. These are well-known facts, of 
which philosophers and linguists have been aware for a long time — but of 
which no clear explanations have been traditionally offered.  
 Indeed, we think that it is one of the strengths of Biolinguistics — under the 
guise criticized by K — that it comes with the only reasonable explanation 
hitherto offered to this recalcitrant problem: Word-systems are inextricably 
connected to a system of computation that — returning to K’s terms — is 
‘transparent’ with respect to the properties of words — namely, words are used 
compositionally and productively. Such an explanation vanishes as soon as this 
mind internal connection is severed and words are reduced to the same condition 
as other non-linguistic symbols — i.e. man-made, public cultural objects. It is 
worth remembering that Wittgenstein, the most conspicuous and influential 
defender of this ‘words-as-external-symbols’ view (Wittgenstein 1953), assumed 
— coherently with the model — that linguistic meanings were not compositional. 
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An idea that he defended ingeniously and enthusiastically (Wittgenstein 1958), 
but that only seems to really work in the case of phrases used (quasi-
idiomatically) in ritualistic or other highly stereotyped situations — in which 
words are actually reduced to the condition of symbols.  
 Wittgenstein’s is not for sure K’s strategy to deal with this problem. It is not 
however completely clear what his strategy is. We think that he is forced to admit 
that compositionality and productivity are inventions added at a certain point — 
if not from the very beginning — to the way words behave. But once this is 
admitted, and given that these are properties unfamiliar to other ‘man-made, 
public cultural’ symbols, the burden of the proof is clearly on the side of the 
defender of the ‘words-as-external-symbols’ view, as it seems extremely counter-
intuitive that the said properties are imprinted via words on an system of 
computation inherently opaque with respect to them.  
 Let us conclude this section by emphasizing that nothing thus far said 
purports to deny the evidence that words have external counterparts (to which 
we can refer as ‘E-words’), or even the admission that parts of the information 
encoded in words have external origins, meaning that FL is not transparent with 
respect to this particular pieces of information (‘E-features’),8 but as we have 
argued none of this actually undermines a natural, biological study of linguistic 
computations. Note only that, by assuming a position like K’s according to which 
words/language are cultural objects with, of course, a biological basis, but one 
that is inaccessible/irrelevant for the study of language, we run the risk of falling 
into the trap of the thesis of the ontological autonomy of culture held by many 
anthropologists and which Dan Sperber (1996) has cogently criticized as being 
blatantly contradictory. Sperber’s point is that ontological autonomy is untenable 
because it is a form of cryptodualism: if you are a materialist, your cultural 
ontology has to be grounded on a physical/material ontology (cultural objects 
must have a material basis if we are not going to accept an ‘irrational’ account of 
causality), otherwise, your cultural ontology is vacuous (see also Jablonka & 
Lamb 2005 for a congenial criticism). An alternative, perhaps closer to Koster’s 
position, is to just say ‘of course there’s a material basis, who ever denied that?’, 
and leaving it there. This is empty materialism (Sperber 1996: 11), a position 
totally incapable of justifying an ontology of cultural objects, which, once its 
material basis is investigated, may turn out to be false.  
 
 
                                                   
    8 As a matter of fact, this is a suitable way of making sense of Chomsky’s concept of linguistic 
‘imperfection’ (Chomsky 1995 and subsequent works), an idea thought to capture those 
aspects of grammars (case and agreement features being two conspicuous examples) that 
seem to lack any motivation from the point of view of the cognitive systems (sensory-motor 
and conceptual) that the computational machine of FL accesses. A reasonable conjecture, 
worth being empirically tested, is that these features work as external devices that stimulate 
the development of the computational system and ease its normal functioning (Lorenzo & 
Longa 2003). This idea would justify preserving to a certain extent K’s instrumental view on 
words. It does not justify, however, the strong instrumentalist thesis (see our section 4) 
according to which words are the tools that create language (TL), as in any event they are 
tools that clearly presuppose the existence of a robust cognitive system (FL) devoted to 
dealing with them. 
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5. Conclusion: What a Shame It Would Be to Abandon Biolinguistics so 
Soon! 
 
The alternative to the various shortcomings of K’s theses is, of course, to stay 
firmly in the idea of FL as an organ — a part of the nervous system that deserves 
the dedication of a special branch of Biology. Questions routinely directed to 
other aspects of the biological realm make also perfect sense when aimed at this 
particular object: What are its component parts and how they compound a 
coherent unit of activity? How can this activity be described in the abstract and 
how is it physically realized? How does it become developmentally assembled 
and how did it evolve this developmental pattern? Such a research program 
cannot be seen, however, as the denial that systems of grammatical conventions 
also exist, the historical creation and transformations of which also deserve a 
scientific branch of specialization. For us it is nonetheless clear that the existence 
of historical grammatical systems is only possible against the background of a 
natural system (FL), the study of which seems mandatory in order to understand 
how they emerge within speaking communities and how they are acquired and 
used by individuals, as well as to establish the putative role of these systems in 
the opposite direction — i.e. as agents with a causal impact in the early 
development of FL in the individual and even in the evolutionary (or co-
evolutionary) process of the faculty in the species.  
 We can give up doing Biolinguistics. Granted. But is it really worth the 
price of renouncing to understand questions like these?  
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